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I. INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC ACCESS IN EXCHANGE FOR MARKET
POWER: Two APPROACHES BASED ON QUID PRO Quo
This Article proposes that Congress revisit the concept of a public
right of access to broadcast media and enact legislation so that those who
do not have market power in the media can have access to local stations in
order to air local views or content. As increased bandwidth, digital
compression, and alternate content sources make it possible for companies
to own more media outlets, policymakers need to look beyond the scarcity
of broadcast frequencies I if they want to foster a true marketplace of ideas.
Courts and policymakers must look at market power and public access in
order to find a viable solution to the lack of diverse programming content.
The debate is not about whether a regional corporation should be permitted
to compete against a conglomerate in the broadcast marketplace, but
whether broadcast media with market power, in return for the access
granted to them by the government, have an obligation to air both local and
nationally diverse views on the public's airwaves.
The access regime advocated in this Article is based on a theory of
quidpro quo:2 a bargained-for exchange in which broadcasters would trade
media access for market power. Under this quid pro quo approach, the FCC
would administer a scaled metric whereby the greater a conglomerate's
1. See infra Part II.B.1.
2. "An action or thing that is exchanged for another action or thing of more or less
equal value; a substitute..." Quidpro quo, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
"Lat. 'what for what' or 'something for something.' The concept of getting something of
value in return for giving something of value. For a contract to be binding, it usually must
involve the exchange of something of value." Quidpro quo, THE 'LECTRIc LAW LIBRARY'S
LEXICON, http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/q003.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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audience reach,3 the more access that conglomerate must provide to
citizens with diverse and/or local content. In an analog broadcasting
context, one possible application of the quid pro quo theory would be to
look to a time-based right of access that is accepted voluntarily by media
companies in exchange for the government granting increased electronic
media ownership caps.
While this Article advocates a specific quid pro quo metric, which is
defined below, there are two distinctively different approaches that would
legally permit the government to trade market power for access even if the
courts abandon the scarcity justifications for access validated by the
Supreme Court in the 1969 case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.4 An
expansive approach to quid pro quo follows existing jurisprudence relating
to contractual waiver of constitutional rights and implements the licensee
as public trustee justification that is also proffered in Red Lion, albeit with
less notoriety. Building upon existing Supreme Court contracts cases and
applied in a media context in Erie Telecommunications v. City of Erie, 853
F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988), this contractual quid pro quo approach allows the
government to enact content regulations not subject to strict scrutiny.5 Such
an approach arguably would permit an activist Congress or the FCC to
revive the Fairness Doctrine 6 or impose even greater speech burdens upon
broadcasters irrespective of scarcity and without scrutiny.
In addition, there is a narrower form of quid pro quo that would
validate "zone-based" 7 access as structural broadcast regulation. This
narrow approach subjects zone-based public access to the same type of
intermediate scrutiny used by the Supreme Court to validate structural
cable regulation in Turner Broadcast System, Inc. v. FCC. In this second
3. The FCC aggregates Nielsen local market data to determine national audience
reach. In 2003, Congress enacted a cap on broadcast ownership that prevents a company
from controlling television stations that reach more than 39% of the national audience. In
January 2004, while the petitions to review the Order were pending in this Court, Congress
amended the 1996 Act by increasing from 35% to 39% the national television ownership
rule's audience reach cap in § 202(c). Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99 (2004);
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2004).
4. The Supreme Court, in the 1969 Red Lion decision, validated the constitutionality
of a limited right of access for broadcast media. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969). The FCC and some courts question the continued validity of that decision because
the Court based its right of access largely on the issue of scarcity. See, e.g., FCC v. League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984); see also Radio-Television News
Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
5. See Erie, 853 F.2d at 1094-96.
6. See infra note 37.
7. An access zone is based on a metric that calculates signal bandwidth and/or
broadcast time. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 520 U.S. 180, 197 (1997); infra
notes 126-27.
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approach, the quid pro quo is not contractual, but rather is present in the
manner in which a court would evaluate the speech burden incidental to the
structural regulation. As part of a content-neutral structural regulation, the
quid pro quo would be a value added for broadcasters, since, with respect
to digital broadcasting, Congress would have the authority to set aside
multiplexed signal streams for public access, just as it currently does with
cable and DBS channels.
9
Moreover, even if the speech burden were deemed to be greater on
broadcasters than it would be in other media outlets, the quid pro quo
would act to mitigate that burden by providing broadcasters with a benefit
to which they would not otherwise be entitled: increased audience reach.
Although the contractual waiver quid pro quo would legally validate the
structural access regulation envisioned herein, its implications on
broadcasting may be too great for Congress to bear in the current political
climate, since it could be used to justify content-intrusive regulation in the
absence of scarcity. Still, politics aside, either approach would validate a
public right of access to broadcast stations and could arguably extend the
reach of access regulation to conglomerate-owned newspapers that would
otherwise be prohibited under the Supreme Court's ruling in Miami Herald
v. Tornillo.10 Indeed, the possibility that market power quid pro quo would
make public access to certain print properties achievable makes these
approaches especially valuable as access regulation.
II. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS: LACK OF ACCESS, LACK OF
DIVERSITY
A. The Current State ofAccess Rights
The United States, unlike many developed countries, offers no
general right of access to any type of media. Still, as a constitutional
matter, it is important to distinguish between a right of reply and a right of
access. A right of reply arises from a speaker's content. This would
encompass the individual right to respond to a personal attack, as in Red
Lion, or the right to air an opposing view in a public controversy. A right
of access, on the other hand, arises for reasons wholly unrelated to speech
content, including the nature of a media technology or the status of the
9. Signal multiplexing allows digital broadcasters to air content on different
programming streams simultaneously. On digital television tuners, these streams appear as
different "channels." See infra Part IV.A.
10. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (citing the First
Amendment to strike down a Florida statute that gave a local candidate a right to publish a
reply to an editorial in a print publication).
11. See generally Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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initial speaker. 2 The difference is important under U.S. Constitutional law,
as rights of access may be devised as content-neutral structural regulations,
while rights of reply are necessarily content regulations. In the aftermath of
the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, there is currently no right of
reply or access available to the American public. 3 A limited right of access
exists for qualified candidates for federal office, and a content-triggered
general right of reply is available to all legally qualified candidates, but
these statutory provisions do not apply to the general public, or indeed to
anyone but opposing candidates. 
14
For print media, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment
forbids the government from legislating rights of reply to newspapers. In
Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that would have given a
candidate the right to respond to a newspaper editorial attacking him.15 The
Court determined that requiring rights of reply was tantamount to
government interference in the editorial discretion of a free press,
notwithstanding the economic obstacles to the candidate making an
effective response to the newspaper's personal attack. The Justices were
specifically concerned with the chilling effect a right of reply statute would
have on robust debate since editors would have an incentive to avoid news
coverage of controversies.1 6  Tornillo's First Amendment analysis,
premised on the theory that anyone can be a publisher, suggests that if the
courts were to determine that broadcasting, as a subset of proliferating
electronic media is not scarce, 17 then a right of reply such as the Fairness
Doctrine would no longer be constitutional for the airwaves, even if
Congress were to enact it.18 While it is clear that Tornillo prohibits rights
of reply to nonscarce media technologies like newspapers, whether it
effectively bans all rights of access to media is a matter open to debate.
With the exception of advertisements that discriminate on the basis of
gender, 19 the Supreme Court has not validated any rights of access for print
media. Thus, in articulating a workable right of access to government-
owned media technology, it is important to address the First Amendment
12. See, e.g., Jerome Barron, The Right of Reply to the Media in the United States-
Resistance and Resurgence, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 1, 2 (1992).
13. See Nat.'l Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-27 (1943).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2002); 47 U.S.C. § 312 (2004).
15. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241. Without reference to its earlier Red Lion decision, the
Supreme Court struck down a state's right of reply statute, again choosing to focus on
scarcity--or the lack of it-as the pivotal First Amendment issue in its review of the
newspaper industry. Id. at 256-57.
16. Id. at 257.
17. See infra Part II.B.2.
18. See Nat. I Brdcst. Co., 319 U.S. at 224-27.
19. See Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
387-88 (1973).
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concerns articulated in Tornillo.
Tornillo must not be read broadly as a bar to all rights of access to
media. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, suggests as much when
he questions the scope of the principal opinion's broad ruling. 2 Still, even
if the Supreme Court were to hold that the First Amendment strictly
prohibits government-mandated access to newspapers, broadcasting is a
different medium, with different characteristics, even in the absence of
scarcity.2 1 To some extent, courts have already recognized that medium-
specific differences can act to limit Tornillo's application to nonscarce
media access. Instructive on this point is the willingness of courts to uphold
the constitutionality of public access rights to cable television systems,
even in the absence of allocational or numerical scarcity.
22
B. Connecting Access, Diversity, and Ownership: An Evolving
Debate
United States broadcast regulation over the last eight decades has
been built upon three interrelated issues: access, diversity, and ownership
of scarce broadcast frequencies. The problem is that these three issues have
proven to have little bearing on each other. Licensing, for example, the
only way the government currently regulates access, has evolved into a
system in which only well-capitalized corporations or the wealthy have a
voice. This is true not only for license transfers, which can be sold at
market rates to third parties, but also of new frequency allocations, which
are auctioned off to the highest bidder. Community groups, individuals of
modest means, and even local companies no longer have a realistic
opportunity to get a license to broadcast in the United States.
1. Scarcity as a Justification for Diversity and Localism
In large measure, the Communications Act of 1934 ("FCA") and its
less comprehensive predecessor, the Federal Radio Act of 1927, were
passed to address a void in technology management in the 1920s that had
led to a "wild west" atmosphere in broadcasting, as fledgling commercial
radio stations overpopulated the airwaves, and radio receiver manufacturers
20. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., concurring).
21. In Mt. Mansfield TV, Inc. v. FCC, for example, the Second Circuit alludes to
incumbent broadcasters' market dominance as "the fruit of a preferred position conferred by
the Government," stating that "[l]ong experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of
listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement
give existing broadcasters a substantial advantage .... " 442 F.2d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971)
(citing Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969)).
22. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see infra
notes 174-76 and accompanying discussion.
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developed incompatible transmission formats. 23 Under the FCA, the FCC
was given a broad mandate to manage broadcast technology, a mandate
including frequency allocations designed to clear signal interference,
ensuring compatible formats and equipment, developing infrastructure such
as transmission towers and signal relays, and administering a licensing
regime whereby the FCC would choose who could become a broadcaster.2&
Radio broadcasters of the time, both independent and those affiliated with
fledgling networks, largely viewed the FCC's role as akin to a police
officer assuring the smooth operation of traffic on a public right of way.
Under this "traffic cop" approach, the FCC could regulate the number of
users of the airwaves and even require those users to use the technology in
a particular way, but the Agency could not regulate the nontechnological
aspects of a station's operations or regulate the broadcaster's substantive
speech.
25
With the advent of the "Chain Broadcasting Regulations" in the late
1930s, the FCC used its public interest mandate to curb the power of
national programming networks, advancing a policy that promoted local
and diverse licensees and programming. 26 In passing the FCA, Congress
contemplated that licensees would operate in local communities, airing
local programming; nowhere did the Act envision the primacy of national
23. See generally Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. 632, 47 U.S.C. § 81-83 (1927)
(repealed 1934).
24. See generally Nat'l Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943) (noting
that the FCC's purpose under the FCA was to "make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."); United States v.
Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968) (noting the Commission's "broad responsibilities
for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting");
James S. Rivers, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that a denial of a
request to operate a radio station at night as well as during the daytime is not abuse of
discretion).
25. See NatT Brdcst., 319 U.S. at 215-16. The Court stated:
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not limited to the
engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet we
are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave
lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the Act does not
restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic. The
facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them.
Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many who apply. And
since Congress itself could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission.
Id.
26. How to measure diversity in broadcasting has been a subject of considerable debate.
See, e.g., MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING, METRICS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(Donald McGannon Communication Research Center, Fordham University) (2003). See
also PHILIP M. NAPOLI & NANCY GILLIS, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND THE DIVERSITY INDEX: A
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AGENDA IN MEDIA OWNERSHIP: RESEARCH AND REGULATION
(Ronald E. Rice ed., Hampton Press (forthcoming 2007)).
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programming distribution in American broadcasting. 27 To prevent network
owners such as NBC and CBS from using the leverage of their highly
popular national radio programs-the "must-hear" programs of the golden
age of radio--to control the programming of local stations around the
country, the FCC greatly curtailed the ability of networks to enter into
affiliation agreements with its licensees. Licensees, for example, were
required to retain the final say on the programs they aired, to limit network
programming to specific times of the day, and to avoid long-term
affiliations. 28
By the spring of 1943, the networks' challenge to FCC authority was
27. See 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2005). The statute says:
The purposes of this subchapter are to ... (2) establish franchise procedures and
standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems and
which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the
local community; ... (4) assure that cable communications provide and are
encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and
services to the public; ... (6) promote competition in cable communications and
minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic burden
on cable systems.
Id. See also Congressional Findings and Policy: Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, § 2(a)(16), (21), 106 Stat. 1460, 1462-63 (1992)
(stating that:
The Congress finds and declares the following: ... (16) As a result of the
economic incentive that cable systems have to delete, reposition, or not carry local
broadcast signals, coupled with the absence of a requirement that such systems
carry local broadcast signals, the economic viability of free local broadcast
television and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously
jeopardized. ... (21) Cable systems should be encouraged to carry low-power
television stations licensed to the communities served by those systems where the
low-power station creates and broadcasts, as a substantial part of its programming
day, local programming.)
See also Nat'l Brdcst., 319 U.S. at 217 ("The avowed aim of the Communications Act of
1934 was to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States.").
28. See 47 U.S.C. § 311 (2005); § 153(9) (defines chain broadcasting as the
"simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations.").
See also Nat'! Brdcst., 319 U.S. at 218. The Court found:
In essence, the Chain Broadcasting Regulations represent a particularization of the
Commission's conception of the 'public interest' sought to be safeguarded by
Congress in enacting the Communications Act of 1934. The basic consideration of
policy underlying the Regulations is succinctly stated in its Report: "With the
number of radio channels limited by natural factors, the public interest demands
that those who are entrusted with the available channels shall make the fullest and
most effective use of them. If a licensee enters into a contract with a network
organization which limits his ability to make the best use of the radio facility
assigned him, he is not serving the public interest. . . . The net effect [of the
practices disclosed by the investigation] has been that broadcasting service has
been maintained at a level below that possible under a system of free competition.
Having so found, we would be remiss in our statutory duty of encouraging 'the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest' if we were to grant
licenses to persons who persist in these practices" (citation omitted).
(Vol. 59
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before the United States Supreme Court. The case, National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States,29 is a landmark in American broadcasting. In a five to
two decision, the Court upheld the authority of the FCC to regulate
broadcast licensees, and by extension, networks, in the public interest.
30
Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the majority, sided with the FCC on
both statutory and constitutional grounds. In assessing the FCC's authority
under the Communications Act, Justice Frankfurter expressly rejected the
networks' "traffic cop" characterization. According to the Court, because
the FCC is burdened to determine the traffic itself, the Act requires the
Agency to exercise subjective judgments. 3 1 The opinion also determined
that the "Chain Broadcasting Regulations" were consistent with the public
interest objectives of the FCA, providing the FCC with statutory authority
to promote local and diverse broadcasting.
32
At a constitutional level, however, the Court's decision in National
Broadcasting established precedent that reverberates to this day. Rejecting
the contention that the FCA itself infringed on broadcasters' First
Amendment rights, the Court held that the FCC's policy of denying
licenses or renewals to broadcasters did not amount to a denial of free
speech.33 The First Amendment was not implicated, according to Justice
Frankfurter, because "[t]here is a fixed natural limitation upon the number
of stations that can operate without interfering with one another."34 The
Supreme Court thus introduced the concept of scarcity: because there are
more applicants for licenses than available frequencies, Congress and the
FCC can justifiably impose special obligations on those fortunate enough
to receive a license.3 5 This type of scarcity, based on the limited allocation
of a renewable but finite natural resource-the frequencies contained in the
electromagnetic spectrum-embodies what today would be called
allocational scarcity.
36
29. 319U.S. 190.
30. Id. at 190, 227 ("Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Rutledge took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases.").
31. Id. at224-27.
32. Id. These rules, which were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1943, still appear in the
Code of Federal Regulations verbatim, despite uneven enforcement by the FCC. See
Affiliation Agreements and Network Program Practices; Territorial Exclusivity in Non-
Network Program Arrangements, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2001).
33. Nat'IBrdcst., 319 U.S. at 226-27.
34. Id. at 213 (citation omitted).
35. A license for an available frequency is essentially a license to use a publicly owned
resource; therefore, it is not just scarcity per se, but scarcity of something that belongs to the
public. As a result of public ownership, there are social implications to allocation of
available frequencies.
36. Allocational scarcity is a function of the limited number of frequencies available in
the electromagnetic spectrum. Since there are not enough frequencies for all those who seek
to use them, allocational scarcity remains unaffected by the development of new media
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In the aftermath of the National Broadcasting decision, Congress and
the FCC used allocational scarcity to justify a series of structural and
content regulations that applied only to broadcast media, including special
rules for access by political candidates, indecency restrictions, community
program responsibilities, and, perhaps most controversially, a general right
of public access known as the Fairness Doctrine.37 Enforced by the FCC
from 1949 to 1987, the Fairness Doctrine imposed two distinct access
obligations on broadcasters. The first, an affirmative responsibility to air
controversial issues of significant public importance, 38 was rarely invoked,
the most notable case involving a group that petitioned a television station
to engage a controversy over strip-mining.39 The second part of the
doctrine required broadcasters to give members of the public a reasonable
opportunity to respond to specific broadcasts, including political editorials
technologies and alternatives to broadcast programming.
37. See Editorialization by Broadcast Licensees, Report of the Commission, 13 F.C.C.R.
1246 (1949) [hereinafter Editorialization Report]. The Fairness Doctrine is a former FCC
rule that required the broadcast media owner to furnish a reasonable opportunity for
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance. The FCC abandoned the
Fairness Doctrine in 1987. See also 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2005) (Fairness Doctrine as
embodied in this statute is described as "Equal opportunities requirement; censorship
prohibition; allowance of station use; news appearances exception; public interest; public
issues discussion opportunities"); § 312(a)(7) (stating:
The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit ... for
willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station, other than a non-
commercial educational broadcast station, by a legally qualified candidate for
Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.)
38. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969). See also Times-Mirror
Brdcst. Co., 24 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 404 (1962).
39. Representative Patsy Mink, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 987,
para. 29 (1976) [hereinafter Patsy Mink Order]. The Opinion and Order stated:
It is our belief, as stated in the Fairness Report, supra, that the licensee could not
reasonably fail to cover an issue which has tremendous impact within the local
service area--that such failure would violate the fairness doctrine. We now
reaffirm that principle. Where, as in the present case, an issue has significant and
possibly unique impact on the licensee's service area, it will not be sufficient for
the licensee as an indication of compliance with the fairness doctrine to show that
it may have broadcast an unknown amount of news touching on a general topic
related to the issue cited in a complaint. Rather it must be shown that there has
been some attempt to inform the public of the nature of the controversy, not only
that such a controversy exists.
Id. See also Editorialization Report, supra note 37, at para. 6 (stating:
It is axiomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass communication in a
democracy is the development of an informed public opinion through the public
dissemination of news and ideas concerning the vital public issues of the day...
The Commission has consequently recognized the necessity for licensees to
devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to the presentation of news
and programs devoted to the consideration and discussion of public issues of
interest in the community served by the particular station.)
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and personal attacks. Broadcasters, and especially television journalists,
were strongly opposed to the Fairness Doctrine in any context, since it
created a chilling effect on the airing of certain content and, when enforced,
effectively allowed the government to make editorial judgments on behalf
of broadcasters. 4 1 By the mid-1960s, the Radio and Television News
Directors Association ("RTNDA") was ready to mount a legal challenge to
the doctrine, in tandem with the complaint of a rural Pennsylvania radio
station that had aired a preacher's personal attack against a writer.
42
In 1969, the Supreme Court combined the RTNDA challenge and the
radio station complaint and delivered a decision in Red Lion Broadcasting
v. FCC.43 While the specific controversy involved the validity of the
Fairness Doctrine, the more general principle of scarcity as a justification
for a variety of special broadcast content regulations was the key issue at
stake. The Supreme Court again ruled for the FCC, despite the fact that in
the quarter century since the National Broadcasting case, radio and
television broadcasters had become more plentiful both nationally and
locally.44 Justice White, writing for the Court, makes it clear that because
there are not enough frequencies available to grant licenses to all
applicants, broadcasters do not enjoy the same First Amendment rights of
nonbroadcasters. 45 Justice White adds that, because of this inherent
scarcity, the First Amendment rights of the public take precedence over the
broadcasters' speech rights.46 In addition to reaffirming the scarcity
concept, the Court posited a second justification for government regulation
in the public interest: because licensees operate over airwaves that belong
to the people, broadcasters have a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the
public. 
7
2. Questioning Allocational Scarcity in a World of Abundant
Media
While little attention-perhaps too little-has been given to the public
trustee theory for broadcast regulation in the years since Red Lion,
challenges to the scarcity justification remained very much in the forefront.
40. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1981) (repealed 1982). See also Editorialization Report,
supra note 37, at paras. 6-7.
41. See Nat'l Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d I101 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Columbia Brdcst.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 164 (1973).
42. Radio-TV News Dirs. Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968); Red
Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
43. RedLion, 395 U.S. 367.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 386-89.
46. Id. at 386-87.
47. Id. at 389.
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In many respects, the Red Lion case represented the zenith for the scarcity
justification. With the advent of proliferating electronic channels of
discourse in the 1970s and 1980s, including those carried over cable,
satellite, and microwave relays, broadcasters and some in government
began to question whether broadcast frequencies could still be
characterized as "scarce," while conveniently ignoring the public trustee
component of the Red Lion argument.
48
Cable and satellite reception in homes meant that, for the first time
since the dawn of radio, an alternative to over-the-air broadcast
programming was available to the American public. Television
broadcasters, who had enjoyed dominant market power for decades
because of their access to a government resource, saw their audience and
their market power begin to erode, a trend that continues to this day. By the
early 1980s, Mark Fowler, the FCC chairman during the Reagan
Administration, was calling for the deregulation of broadcasting, recasting
scarcity in terms of numbers of channels, as opposed to allocated
technology. Under this "numerical scarcity" approach, Fowler and other
deregulatory advocates essentially argued that, since electronic media were
no longer scarce, a free market would promote competition and foster
diversity both in terms of license ownership and programming. 49 While the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the debate over the continued saliency of
scarcity, it has not abandoned its holding in Red Lion.50 The same cannot
48. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.11. See also Radio-
TV News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
49. See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207, 221-26 (1982).
50. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1994). The
Court explained:
The broadcast cases are inapposite in the present context because cable television
does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast
medium. Indeed, given the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital compression
technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers
who may use the cable medium. Nor is there any danger of physical interference
between two cable speakers attempting to share the same channel. In light of these
fundamental technological differences between broadcast and cable transmission,
application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the
other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of
cable regulation.
Id. See also Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 674 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The
court explained:
Interestingly, in responding to Government's argument that cable and broadcast
are alike in that they both are beset by market dysfunction, the TBS Court stated
that "the special physical characteristics of broadcast transmission, not the
economic characteristics of the broadcast market, are what underlies our broadcast
jurisprudence." (citations omitted). Apparently, the Court is now prepared to
abandon the economic scarcity theory.
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be said for the Fairness Doctrine, which the Court permitted the FCC to
abandon in 1987 for reasons unrelated to scarcity.i
In recent years, Congress and the FCC have continued to deregulate
electronic media, citing many of the same arguments from the 1980s. In the
mid-1990s, for example, Congress lifted caps on radio station license
ownership, relaxed limits on broadcast ownership, and deregulated cable.
5 2
In 2003, the FCC proposed a sweeping review of all remaining ownership
regulations for television.5 3 Chairman Michael Powell, a long-time
advocate of marketplace diversity, argued forcefully that new technologies
like the Internet make the scarcity rationale obsolete. Breathing new life
into the numerical scarcity approach, Powell believes that Americans live
in a world where there is an "abundance of media," and, in a literal sense,
he is right.5 4 Compared to the 1970s, there are many more channels-
broadcast, cable, satellite, Internet---competing for consumers of content.
While the Rehnquist Court voiced support for the allocational scarcity
arguments of Red Lion in three of its decisions,55 if the FCC and many
broadcasters have their way, it may only be a matter of time before the
"abundance of media" argument gains ground in the reconstituted Roberts
51. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). See also Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
52. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat.
56, 110 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (1996). See also id. at § 202(a) ("The
Commission shall modify section 73.3555 of its regulations (47 C.F.R. 73.3555) by
eliminating any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast stations which may
be owned or controlled by one entity nationally."); id. at § 202(c) (instructing the
Commission to eliminate "the restrictions on the number of television stations that a person
or entity may directly or indirectly own, operate, or control, or have a cognizable interest in,
nationwide . . . " and to increase the "national audience reach limitation for television
stations to 35 percent."); id. at § 202(f) ("The Commission shall revise section 76.501 of its
regulations (47 C.F.R. 76.501) to permit a person or entity to own or control a network of
broadcast stations and a cable system.").
53. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast
and Cable/MDS Interests, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11 F.C.C.R. 19895
(1996) [hereinafter Review of Attribution Regulations].
54. See Larry Shaughnessy, FCC: Media Rules Will Change, CNN.COM, June 2, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/06/02/fcc.media/index.html (discussing the merits of
proposed rules which would allow:
a single media company [to] own enough television stations to reach as much as
45 percent of the U.S. television market, up from the current ceiling of 35 percent.
Companies would be allowed to own both television stations and newspapers in
all but the smallest markets, and in large markets, individual companies could own
several radio and television stations as well as the newspaper and cable outlet.)
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
55. See generally Turner 11, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997);
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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Court.5 6  And if, as a result, content regulations are deemed
unconstitutional, then the implications on rights of access to broadcasting
may be significant.
3. Free Markets, Diversity, and Localism
Media channels, in fact, may have become more numerically
abundant, but are they more diverse? In trying to answer that question,
advocates of greater government intervention have focused on the issue of
media ownership from an antitrust perspective. In the context of broadcast
ownership, a free market system does not bring about diversity, either in
terms of the multiplicity of sources or programming content. Indeed, the
lesson of broadcast deregulation is that market power left unchecked leads
to three distinct concerns that curb both source and programming diversity:
concentration, conglomeration, and the "corporatization" of media. For
broadcasting, concentration of ownership has meant fewer companies now
own more licenses.57 The result, a reduction in the numbers of
independently owned and community-managed stations, has increased
profits for broadcasters even as it hurts diversity.
58
Conglomeration refers to the advent of large companies who, in the
wake of market deregulation, have amassed sizable holdings in a variety of
different media, such as broadcast, cable, satellite, and Internet, and in the
companies, studios, and networks, that produce and distribute the content
carried on those media. Again, the result, while profitable, harms diversity
as the conglomerate consolidates previously independent media outlets to
56. See, e.g., Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that
contrary to the implication of the networks' argument, this court is not in a
position to reject the scarcity rationale even if we agree that it no longer makes
sense. The Supreme Court has already heard the empirical case against that
rationale and still 'declined to question its continuing validity.');
Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that "[w]ire-
carried media like cable, of course, have no such limitations, and thus we found the 'scarcity
rationale' that the Supreme Court has used to justify broadcast television regulations to offer
no succor to those seeking to establish the constitutional validity of cable television
regulations.") (citation omitted).
57. See Free Press, Who Owns the Media, http://www.freepress.net/content/ownership
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
58. In broadcast radio, for example, station ownership declined by 25 percent, from
5,100 owners prior to the 1996 Telecommunications Act to a mere 3,800 owners by the end
of 2001. Anastasia Bednarski, Note, From Diversity to Duplication: Mega-Mergers and the
Failure of the Marketplace Model Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 273, 287 (2003). As a result of consolidation in the radio market, there has been
a rapid increase in syndicated programming. Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game of
Radiopoly: An Antitrust Perspective of Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM.
L.J. 473, 491 (2000).
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reduce operational redundancies and cross-promote its businesses. 59
"Corporatization" of broadcasting is what happens when the free market
drives up the costs of licenses to the point that only corporations can afford
to be broadcasters. In the private marketplace, this type of price inflation is
desirable, as sellers should be able to profit from the capital appreciation of
their assets. But broadcasting is not a private marketplace, and diversity
suffers qualitatively when only one segment of society-corporate
America--controls what gets seen and heard on the public's airwaves.
In 2004, a group of re-regulation advocates, led by public interest law
firm Media Access Project, successfully challenged the FCC's proposals to
relax or eliminate ownership restrictions in the courts by emphasizing the
impact of this deregulation on source diversity and program diversity,
especially in news coverage. While this challenge, heard in the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, may have slowed the deregulation juggernaut at
the FCC, it is unclear whether the more influential D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, known for opinions advocating deregulation, will agree with the
concerns espoused by the Third Circuit. Whether it does or does not, the
issue of numerical scarcity in light of an Internet-fueled "abundance of
media" will likely wind its way into the Supreme Court by the end of the
decade.
Throughout all this, Congress has remained largely acquiescent to the
political power of media conglomerates, even though they have proven to
be less willing to accommodate industry interests than the FCC on key
issues such as broadcast television ownership caps,6 1  children's
59. See Charles Layton, News Blackout, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 2003-Jan. 2004,
18, 18-19, available at http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=3500. See also Robert Philpot, Evil
Empires?, FT. WoRTH STAR TELEGRAM, April 25, 2004, at D.
60. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus), 373 F.3d 372, 385-86 (3rd Cir.
2004). Large companies that implement consolidation and synergy techniques are dropping
original independent newscasts because they do not maximize corporate profits, opting
instead for national syndicated newscasts. Michael S. Schneider, Local Newscasts Fall
Victim To Cost Cuts, VARIETY, Jan. 28, 2002-Feb. 3, 2002, at 21; Dan Trigoboff, CBS
Drops News In Detroit, BRDCST. & CABLE, Nov. 25, 2002, at 12. As a result of increased
acquisition of owned and operated stations by networks and fewer affiliate stations,
affiliates are unable to exercise their right to preempt under network/affiliate rules.
Preemption is a valuable right, since it allows a local affiliate to reject network
programming. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial Review]. Due to their
increased power, networks are able to decline special news presentations, such as
presidential debates. Paul B. Matey, Abundant Media, Viewer Scarcity: A Marketplace
Alternative to First Amendment Broadcast Rights and the Regulation of Televised
Presidential Debates, 36 IND. L. REv. 101, 127 (2003). Networks have also taken advantage
of their consolidated market position to cut costs of coverage by pooling their resources,
resulting in erroneous results and one-sided newscasts. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice
as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. Pin. L. REv. 503, 519 (2001).
61. Congress has repeatedly thwarted FCC initiatives to relax television ownership
Number 1 ]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
television,62 indecency, 63 and vertical and horizontal channel ownership
limitations for cable systems. 64  In enacting cable caps, Congress
recognized that unregulated market power would lead to continued
consolidation of cable system ownership and control of channel
programming in an industry that is already dominated by Time Warner and
Comcast.6 5 At the same time, Congress has also been willing to enact
structural regulation to protect broadcast licensees from the more dominant
market power of cable, giving broadcasters the option of requiring local
cable systems to retransmit station signals at no cost. 66 These "must-carry"
restrictions: in 1984, when Congress enacted a 25 percent ownership limitation, effectively
overruling then FCC chairman Mark Fowler's attempt to sunset station ownership caps
altogether; in 1996, when Congress maintained an increased ownership cap of 35 percent for
television after deregulating radio ownership; and in 2003, by enacting legislation to raise
the cap to 39 percent, despite an FCC effort to institute a 45 percent cap. See Amendment of
Section 73.3555, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) (Congress imposes 25 percent
cap in 1984); Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1996) (Congress maintains 35
percent cap for TV); 2002 Biennial Review, supra note 60, at para. 499 (FCC sets cap at 45
percent); Prometheus, 373 F.3d 372 (responding to 45 percent cap); Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629(1), 118 Stat. 3, 99 (2004)
(Congress sets cap at 39 percent while Prometheus is still pending).
62. Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990).
63. See generally Broadcasting Obscene Language, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See also Enforcement of 18 U.S.C. 1464, 47 C.F.R.
73.3999 (1995).
64. See generally Comm'ns Cable Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 9374 (May 2005); Cable Television
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
65. See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (The court
stated:
Experience under the 1984 Cable Act's deregulatory regime led Congress to enact
the 1992 Cable Act .... In 1992, Congress found that the deregulated cable
industry had become the 'dominant nation-wide video medium,' serving 'over 60
percent of the households with televisions.' The legislative record also showed
that the industry was 'highly concentrated.' In addition, Congress found that 'most
cable television subscribers have no opportunity to select between competing
cable systems,' and that '[t]he result is undue market power for the cable operator
as compared to that of consumers.' Congress also found that the average monthly
cable rate had increased 'almost 3 times as much as the Consumer Price Index
since rate deregulation.' . . . Congress concluded that rate reregulation was
necessary to ensure that cable operators would not exercise 'undue market power
vis-a-vis video programmers and consumers.')
(quoting 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. 102-385 § 2) (internal citations omitted). See also Turner
II, 520 U.S. 180, 197 (1997) ("Evidence indicated the structure of the cable industry would
give cable operators increasing ability and incentive to drop local broadcast stations from
their systems, or reposition them to a less-viewed channel.").
66. Carriage of Local Commercial Television Signals, 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2000); Carriage
of Noncommercial Educational Television, 47 U.S.C. § 535 (2000). Congress enacted the
Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992 on October 5, 1992. This Act contains
two provisions that require cable operators to carry local broadcast station signals without
charge at the broadcaster's election. These provisions, sections 614 and 615 of the 1992
Cable Act, apply to the signals of commercial and noncommercial educational stations
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rules, upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1997, 67 were
designed not only to address market competition, but also to promote
programming diversity in broadcasting, which Congress specifically found
to be at risk by the early 1990s.68 At least with respect to cable regulation,
Congress has recognized a nexus between program diversity and
consolidated ownership.
69
Still, when it comes to broadcasting, Congress evidently agrees with
the FCC that allowing concentrated ownership of broadcast licenses will
keep over-the-air broadcasting viable and relevant in a market growing
increasingly competitive with cable, satellite, and Internet. The same can
be said of Congress's failure to overrule the FCC's repeal of the Financial
Interest and Syndication ("Fin-Syn") Rules in 1996, which, since 1970, had
prevented broadcast networks from vertically consolidating with studios to
produce and syndicate programming. 7 1 These deregulatory positions,
consistent with the free market mandate of numerical scarcity advocates,
may possibly help bolster broadcasting in the marketplace. Broadcast
networks, although still powerful, no longer attract the huge audience
shares of the 1960s, and the synergy of owning both stations and studios
has allowed broadcasters--or at least the conglomerates that own them--to
cut programming costs and participate in the hugely profitable syndication
environment.
What Congress and the FCC have failed to take into account is the
substantial negative impact on programming caused by the easing of
structural broadcast regulation. Government policymakers need to
recognize that numerical scarcity reduces not only diversity of ownership,
but also the diversity of the programming aired by those owners, especially
when the "abundance" of media outlets are controlled by a few powerful
corporations. Local musicians already complain that they cannot get
airtime on radio stations unless they have a business relationship with Clear
Channel or CBS Corp., the two conglomerates that now dominate radio in
respectively. Together, these sections are known as the "must-carry" rules. See id.
67. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224-25 (holding that must-carry regulations were content-
neutral and narrowly tailored to advance Congress' interests in preserving the benefits of
free, over-the-air local broadcast television, promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources, and promoting fair competition in the market for
television programming).
68. See 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. 102-385 § 2(a)(4) ("The cable industry has become
highly concentrated. The potential effects of such concentration are barriers to entry for new
programmers and a reduction in the number of media voices available to consumers."). Id.
at § 2(a)(6) ("There is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in
promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology media.").
69. See 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. 102-385 § 2 (1992).
70. See id.
71. Prime Time Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (j)(ii) (1994) (Fin-Syn Rules).
Number 1)]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
the wake of its deregulation in 1996.72 In the decade since the "Fin-Syn"
Rules were repealed, every major independent producer of television
entertainment in Hollywood, save one, has either gone out of business or
been absorbed into a conglomerate. 73 Indeed, from a programming
diversity standpoint, consolidation of radio and television ownership has
meant consolidation of programming decisions, as corporate owners
combine once independent news operations, remove station management
from the localities they purport to serve, and adopt more risk-averse rules
to rein in controversial or edgy programming that might negatively affect
shareholder return. This is precisely the type of programming that would be
fostered in a public access system in which licensees do not have the
discretion to make programming decisions based on market considerations.
C. Revisiting the Public Trustee Theory
If one accepts the premise that scarcity cannot exist when media are
numerically abundant, then it becomes difficult to justify regulating
television and radio broadcasting any differently than other media. Except
for antitrust issues relating to abuse of market power-laws that in recent
years have been relaxed across industries-there is little that diversity
advocates can do to stop the current trend toward consolidation and merger
among broadcasters. But this premise need not be accepted. In fact, the
better argument is that the numerical abundance of electronic media
channels justifies greater regulation of broadcast ownership and
programming diversity. Since broadcasting is now a significantly smaller
piece of the media pie, the use of public airwaves to distribute program
content should be less important to these conglomerates. Yet, the large
media companies continue to lobby for the opportunity to increase their
broadcast holdings and pay millions to acquire new licenses despite the fact
that broadcasting may be subject to content regulations 4 la Red Lion.
Why do these companies refuse to rid themselves of the specter of
72. See, e.g., Ben Bagdikian, Grand Theft: The Conglomeratization of Media and the
Degradation of Culture, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Jan./Feb. 2005, available at
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2005/012005/bagdikian.html:
For 25 years, a handful of large corporations that specialize in every mass medium
of any consequence has dominated what the majority of people in the United
States see about the world beyond their personal experience. These giant media
firms, unlike any in the past, thanks to the hands-off attitude of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) majority, are unhampered by laws and
regulation. In the process, they have been major agents of change in the social
values and politics of the United States.
73. See Hey Bud, Cut Us a Slice, FIN. TIMES REPORTS, Feb. 25, 2002, at 20; The
Museum Of Broadcast Communications, Independent Production Companies,
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/l/htmll/independentp/independentp.htm (last visited on
Nov. 12, 2006).
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intrusive regulation by simply migrating their distribution operations to
cable or the Internet? The answer lies in a reality that numerical scarcity
advocates seem unwilling to recognize: numerical abundance fails to
account for qualitative disparities among media outlets. Put simply, not all
media channels are the same. The difference comes down to market power.
Conglomerates are eager for more broadcast stations precisely because
broadcasting gets special treatment from the government; regulations have
essentially privileged broadcasting in the marketplace for decades, and
continue to do so. In addition to protective structural regulations such as the
"must-carry" rules, broadcasting is the only medium with universal
access-all televisions, for example, are capable of receiving broadcast
signals. The conglomerates who own incumbent broadcasters are keenly
aware of the competitive advantages of the broadcast medium. As the
market has become more competitive, companies with diverse media
holdings have become increasingly willing to leverage their incumbency as
broadcasters to extend their audience reach through cross-promotion on
nonbroadcast outlets and by requiring affiliates to carry strategically
significant programming.
74
In an abundant media marketplace, the owners of a transmission
conduit should be completely free to impose whatever conditions they
74. The synergy that results from internal production, initial distribution, syndication,
and repurposing allows these consolidated "media giants to gain carriage on cable systems.
. enabl[ing] the parent corporations of the broadcasters to capture a large share of the non-
broadcast video market." Media Ownership: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Commerce, Sc. and Transp., 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Mark Cooper, President,
Consumer Federation of America), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfin?id=950&witid=2679. For example, the General Electric merger permitted
profitable cross-promotion across the new company's extensive cable and broadcast
networks, allowing the company to use its broadcast and cable properties to promote
company business interests, rather than the goals of localism and diversity. See Press
Release, GE, General Electric and Vivendi Universal Sign Agreement to Merge NBC and
Vivendi Universal Entertainment (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.ge.com/pr/display.
php?highlight=true&id=1443&keyword=. The vast consolidation of these media outlets
results in efforts of cross-promotion, synergy, and cost-saving techniques, which fail to
promote the Commission's goals of localism and diversity. For example, independent local
news stations are being acquired by conglomerates and managed by their local affiliates,
effectively removing any independent local news coverage. See Bill Moyers, On Big Media,
TRUTHOUT, Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/mergers/2003/l
010bigmedia.htm. Original programming has given way to syndicated programming, which
is also increasingly owned by the conglomerate that controls the licensee. Edward D.
Cavanagh, De-Regulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust Enough?, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 67, 74-75 (2003) (citing Polly Higgins, Tucson Radio Making Waves: Corporate
Radio Moves In, TucsoN CITIZEN, May 3, 2002, at Al). Additionally, vertical integration
allows conglomerates to own much of the content they air, making it more likely for them to
exclude local content, in which they do not have a financial stake. See Broadcast Localism:
Hearing Before the FCC (2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attach
match/DOC-242307A l.pdf.
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choose on those seeking to make use of that conduit's market power.
Moreover, since the U.S. government "owns" the airwaves in public trust
for the people, Congress and the FCC thus have the right to impose
conditions that may be quite onerous on a broadcaster's speech rights
without trampling upon the First Amendment. 75 Congress affirmed this
right on behalf of government expressly in the FCA itself, providing "for
the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for
limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no
such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms,
conditions, and period of the license." 76 If a conglomerate does not like the
condition, media abundance means that it can take its programming
elsewhere.
77
The theory of broadcaster as public trustee is such that it should stand
alone as a justification for broadcast access regulation, divorced from the
imperiled scarcity justification of Red Lion.78 Although one could argue
that the scarcity arguments of Red Lion no longer apply due to the
proliferation of new electronic media, that same proliferation actually
strengthens the case for using a quid pro quo justification. In an expansive
media market, speakers who do not wish to accept the conditions that
attach to the government-granted benefit of a broadcast license now have
viable alternatives such as cable, satellite, and Internet.
To a great extent, the major media conglomerates have already
become dominant owners in these media alternatives, partly in an effort to
provide programming not subject to the lowest common denominator of the
highly regulated broadcast market, but mainly as part of a strategy to
promote increased viewership of the conglomerate's flagship broadcast
75. To some extent, Congress has exercised that right using the scarcity argument, but
not the public fiduciary argument, to justify specific burdens on broadcasters in the
Children's Television Act, indecency legislation, and the repeated imposition of ownership
caps. See supra notes 71-74.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
77. Some deregulation advocates contend that onerous government regulation of
broadcasters amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property. See, e.g., Satellite
Brdcst. and Comm. Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001). Such a position is not
supportable under the FCA, which requires licensees to waive any claim to a property
interest in the broadcast spectrum. 47 U.S.C. § 304 (2000). Stating:
No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant therefor
shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular frequency or of the
electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United States
because of the previous use of the same, whether by license or otherwise.
See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) ("The policy of the
Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of
the granting of a license.").
78. 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1968).
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outlet.79 For example, Fox will use its Fox Sports Net and FX cable stations
to air Major League Baseball games with limited appeal, or even minor
playoff games, when a game with greater audience appeal is scheduled to
air on the Fox Broadcast Network, but the World Series games always air
on the Fox Broadcast Network, just as the Superbowl always airs on a
broadcast station. The fact that major television events air on licensed
broadcast properties establishes that the government benefit conferred upon
broadcasters-market power-remains just as strong, if not stronger, in an
era of rapidly expanding multichannel video programming distribution
("MVPD") alternatives.
Media conglomerates recognize that they are receiving this
government benefit when they choose to continue to operate broadcast
licenses, when they produce original news and entertainment programs for
broadcast, and when they buy or sell broadcast licenses for millions of
dollars. Conglomerates may not thank the government for the benefits
bestowed upon them by the grant of a broadcast license, but the
marketplace speaks for itself. After all, if broadcasting were a bad bargain,
licenses would presumably be plentiful and inexpensive.
While many, including the FCC, cite the proliferation of media
channels as a justification for abandoning broadcast regulation altogether,80
79. See Shaughnessy, supra note 54.
80. See Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
F.C.C.R. 5043, para. 64 (1987). The Commission determined that the "comprehensive study
of the telecommunications market in the 1985 Fairness Report has convinced us [the
Commission] that [the scarcity] rationale that supported the doctrine in years past is no
longer sustainable in the vastly transformed, diverse market that exists today." Id. See also
Press Release, FCC, FCC Commissioner Michael Powell Advises Investment Analysts to
Look for Evidence of Regulators Promoting Innovation and Competition (Mar. 13, 1998),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/NewsReleases/1998/nrmc8024.
html:
Quoting Albert Einstein, Powell said, 'The unleashed power of the atom has
changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward
unparalleled catastrophe.' Reflecting on where [sic] the country is in the
communications revolution, Powell remarked 'I often think of Einstein's
warning,' and questioned whether the industry is 'truly changing enough, and
quickly enough to accommodate' the transformation to a pro-competitive,
deregulatory communications regime. Powell set forth several tenets of 'new
regulatory thinking' that should guide policy leaders in light of the pro-
competitive, de-regulatory environment and the immense power and potential of
communications technology unleashed:
1) Faith in competition, and courage to cede control to the marketplace;
2) Focus on innovation when dealing with network industries that are driven by
technology;
3) Prepare for the regulatory implosion of traditionally distinct technologies and
services;
4) Strive for regulatory efficiency. In this regard, regulatory agencies must make
timely decisions, be sensitive to business realities and capital markets, and shift
their efforts to enforcement.
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the issue is not as much about scarcity as it is about the government doling
out a public benefit of market power to private parties. Indeed, if
broadcasters, irrespective of numerical or even allocational scarcity, are
recipients of a government benefit, they should offer something of value in
exchange for that market advantage. Under either the expansive contractual
waiver of rights quid pro quo or the narrower structural regulation quid pro
quo examined in this Article, all parties come out ahead. Broadcasters can
acquire more licenses, the public gets access to broadcast channels
heretofore unavailable to them, and the government achieves the goals of
diversity and localism through access regulations that have proven elusive
through its regulation of ownership.
III. APPLYING THE QUID PRO Quo ARGUMENT TO ELECTRONIC
MEDIA
A. Quid Pro Quo in Lieu of Scrutiny
1. Erie's Contractual Quid Pro Quo Approach
Some courts have employed a more expansive approach to quid pro
quo, arguing that as a matter of contract, a company can waive
constitutional rights,8 1 including fundamental First Amendment rights that
would otherwise be subject to a level of constitutional scrutiny. With
respect to First Amendment rights, the expansive quid pro quo argument
first appears in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti.82 While the Court held that Massachusetts could not proscribe
the political speech rights of corporations created under state charter,
Justice Rehnquist disagreed on the principle that corporations, as persons
created pursuant to state law, can have additional regulations placed upon
them, even at the cost of rights that would otherwise be available to natural
persons. 83 For Justice Rehnquist, the bargained-for exchange is implicit in
the creation of the commercial entity under state law. Since a state "confers
special privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons"
when it creates a commercial entit such as a corporation, the entity "would
be subject to like regulation... .8 4
In Erie, the Third Circuit also used an expansive quid pro quo
approach to uphold an agreement between the City of Erie and its cable
franchisee that imposed fees and public access requirements that would
81. See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. The City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (1988).
82. See 435 U.S. 765, 822-28 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 827.
84. Id.
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otherwise have been subject to constitutional scrutiny as a content
regulation. 8 Although the court does not refer to Justice Rehnquist's
implied social contract reasoning, the rationale for waiver, as in Justice
Rehnquist's Bellotti dissent, is rooted in contract principles. 86 After
reviewing a long line of Supreme Court precedents that permit waiver of
constitutional rights in general, the Third Circuit articulates a broad rule
that First Amendment rights may be bargained away when "the party
foregoing its rights has done so of its own volition, with full understanding
of the consequences of its waiver."
8 7
In arriving at this holding, the Third Circuit reviews two prior
Supreme Court cases in which a contracting party alleged that the other
party waived fundamental constitutional rights. In the first Supreme Court
case, D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the Court held
that a warehousing company waived procedural due process rights of
notice and counsel when it entered into, and subsequently breached, an
installation contract with a refrigerator manufacturer. 8 In the second case,
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Justices ruled that a consumer
who purchased household goods did not waive due process rights in a
dispute with a retailer, despite the fact that an adhesion contract 89 stipulated
such a waiver.
90
The distinction between the two cases is set forth in a passage from
Fuentes that is cited in the Erie opinion. In Fuentes, the Court explains that
the two cases are distinguishable because of the parties' relative bargaining
ability and actual knowledge of waiver.91 Although the Supreme Court in
Fuentes makes reference to unequal bargaining power, the Court focuses
on the limited context of adhesion contracts.92 The more fundamental issue,
as it turns out, is whether the waiving party was "'aware of the
significance' of the waiver provision." 93 Indeed, under the specific facts of
Fuentes, the Court determines that the appellant homemaker did not waive
her constitutional rights since the consumer product manufacturer "made
no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or made
aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as a waiver of
85. See generally Erie, 853 F.2d 1084.
86. Id. at 1090 (recognizing a party's freedom to contract).
87. Id. at 1096.
88. 405 U.S. at 187-88.
89. An adhesion contract is "[a] standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be
signed by the party in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with
little choice about the terms." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004).
90. 407 U.S. at 95-96.
91. Erie, 853 F.2d at 1096 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95).
92. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95.
93. Erie, 853 F.2d at 1096 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95).
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constitutional rights."
94
For the Erie court, this reliance on actual awareness as a condition to
waiver provides specific guidance into what the Supreme Court would
require for a valid contractual waiver in the context of constitutional free
speech rights.95 The principal focus for the Third Circuit is on whether the
waiving party did so with "volition and understanding," which the court
explains is deemed to be present "where the parties to the contract have
bargaining equality and have negotiated the terms of the contract, and
where the waiving party is advised by competent counsel and has engaged
in other contract negotiations."
96
Although the court does not say it in so many words, ultimately it
comes down to a question of whether the party is sophisticated and well-
advised. If so, the Third Circuit will deem that the party entered into the
contract with the volition and understanding necessary to make a waiver of
constitutional rights valid.97 Fuentes, an individual who was purchasing
goods and services for her home, entered into a contract with fine print.
Overmyer, on the other hand, concerned a corporation who had both
received representation by counsel and negotiated a deal in a business
context.98 While the focus on negotiation and bargaining equality might
have proven to be a problem when a government dictates terms to a private
business entity in exchange for media rights or licenses, the Erie court, by
focusing on sophistication and legal counsel, applies the Supreme Court's
prior jurisprudence on contractual waivers of rights to the case of a cable
company suing over content regulations imposed by a city government.
99
Interestingly, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's summary
judgment decision. Its decision to apply a quid pro quo analysis as an
alternative to constitutional scrutiny represented a deliberate departure
from the trial judge's approach.100 Although the district court found for the
City of Erie, it was not on the basis of contractual waiver.10 1 In concluding
that the city's access requirements were constitutional, the district court
rejected the applicability of a waiver rationale because the cable company
"lacked knowledge of its rights."' 0 2 The court went on to explain that "in
94. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95.
95. See Erie, 853 F.2dat 1096.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1097.
98. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972).
99. See Erie, 853 F.2d at 1096.
100. Id. at 1096-97 (noting that although contractual waiver issues were not raised in the
lower court, the failure to raise those issues should not have any bearing on determining
whether or not a party waived its constitutional rights).
101. See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 605 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
102. Id. at 586.
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light of the ambiguity and uncertainty" of the law with respect to cable
companies' First Amendment rights at the time of the contract, Erie
Telecommunications, Inc. could not have waived a right of which it was
not actually aware. The fact that the appellate court dispenses with a
requirement of actual knowledge in favor of deemed volition and
understanding is significant, since under the Third Circuit's reasoning, a
sophisticated, well-advised party may be deemed to have waived rights
even if the right had not fully emerged as a matter of law, or if the party
was unaware that the right, in fact, existed.
1 04
2. Contractual Approach to Quid Pro Quo after Erie
Erie is still good law in the Third Circuit, but it remains the only case
to expressly apply a contractual waiver of First Amendment rights in a
dispute involving media access. 105 While the Seventh Circuit refers to Erie
in Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Commission, 879
F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989), a case that also examines the validity of local
cable ordinances, the Chicago Cable court's reference to contractual
waiver is limited to an introductory footnote in which the court determines
that it will not decide the issue "since neither party advanced the argument
here or in the district court." 10 6 Even so, the footnote contains enough
analysis to offer readers some sense of how the Seventh Circuit panel
would have considered the issue had they ruled it justiciable. 10 7 In the first
part of the footnote, the panel raises the waiver issue as "conceivabl(e),"
and focuses on the fact that Erie's contract was a consent decree to prior
litigation, as opposed to an initial franchising agreement between the
government and a cable company, which was at issue in Chicago Cable.1
0 8
The difference in the type of contract turns out to be a "significant
distinction" for the court, since the footnote adds that "serious reservations
arise when a local government with a virtual monopoly on cable access
conditions a franchise contract with a cable programmer on the stipulation
that the programmer waive certain constitutional rights."'
10 9
103. Id. at 585. Because he views lack of actual knowledge as a bar to waiver, Judge
Mencer relies instead on the O'Brien test of intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the
access requirements were constitutional noncontent regulation. In turning to O'Brien, the
district court engages the First Amendment implications of government access requirements
in a manner that has, in the years since the Erie case, become the more typical approach of
courts. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
104. Erie, 853 F.2d at 1095-96 (citing Fuentes and Overmyer).
105. See id. at 1084.
106. Chicago Cable, 879 F.2d at 1548 n.6.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Without reading too much into a single footnote, the Seventh Circuit's
brief treatment of the waiver issue suggests that its view conflicts with the
Third Circuit's holding in Erie. In emphasizing "virtual monopoly"
power 10 on the part of the city, the Chicago Cable court seems to be
suggesting that the two parties to a cable franchising agreement have
unequal bargaining power. 11 Although the court does not say so expressly,
the connection to the Supreme Court's contractual waiver precedent is
evident.1 12 As the Third Circuit points out, the difference between
Overmyer and Fuentes was that Fuentes signed an adhesion contract as a
condition to a consumer purchase, 113 whereas Overmyer's contract was a
negotiated business transaction between parties with equal bargaining
power." 4 While it is true that some contracts involving monopolistic power
may involve unequal bargaining power, the Seventh Circuit panel is at odds
with the Third Circuit if it suggests that such unequal bargaining power
would be present in franchise agreements merely because the government
controls access.115
3. Contractual Quid Pro Quo and the Nature of Cable Franchise
Agreements
First, the reality of a cable franchise agreement is that it is a contract
that effectively grants monopoly power to a cable company.16 Since local
rights of way and other access benefits belong to the government, the
government is not using unequal bargaining power to condition access; it is
merely retaining some of the power it would otherwise have the right to
reserve for its own use or could bargain away freely to another party. In
granting a benefit that is not available to everyone, the government should
be permitted to condition its grant on a waiver of rights that the cable
company would otherwise not have.
In addition, prohibiting the government from placing conditions on its
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1550.
112. Id. at 1550-51.
113. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
114. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972).
115. Compare Chicago Cable Comm. v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1548
n.6 (7th Cir. 1989), with Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. The City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1101
(1988).
116. Although the 1996 Telecommunications Act prohibits exclusive franchising by
municipalities, permitting alternative cable providers to "overbuild" rights of way, such
overbuilding is rare on account of cost and market saturation. Efforts to overbuild even in
large markets, such as New York, Boston, Washington, D.C., and other cities have failed to
make an alternative cable provider competitive in those markets. K.C. Neel, Fresh Start for
RCN: A Rocky Road Leads the MO to Smoother Terrain, MULTICHANNEL NEws, Apr. 18,
2005, at 29.
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grant of a monopoly would significantly reduce a municipality's power to
negotiate on behalf of its citizens. Cities would effectively be limited to an
all or nothing approach to bargaining."17 Government would either have to
give up all of its access rights without limitation or refrain from entering
into these franchise agreements altogether, since cities are not required to
contract with cable companies. The result would be less bargaining power
for both sides, since there would be virtually no room for negotiation on the
issue.
Moreover, a franchise agreement between a city and a cable provider
is not an adhesion contract. Unlike a household consumer, a cable company
is expected to be aware of the rights it is giving up in exchange for the
benefits it will receive under a franchise agreement. This is not a question
of an unsophisticated party not reading the fine print of a form contract. In
every instance, cable companies seeking to enter into a franchise agreement
are familiar with the issues, can conduct negotiations, and are advised by
competent counsel. 118 Indeed, this is precisely why the Third Circuit
deemed volition and understanding to encompass a totality of
circumstances that included bargaining equality, the presence of actual
negotiation, and the availability of counsel, and why the Erie court held
that Erie Telecommunications, Inc. had acted with volition and
understanding when it entered into a contract that required it to waive
certain First Amendment rights. 119
While the decision in Erie, that volition and understanding includes
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, is based on a fair reading
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Fuentes and Overmyer, 12  other
circuits, including the Seventh, remain free to develop their own approach
to these precedents. Unfortunately, the Chicago Cable court does not
address either of these cases, choosing instead to list, without elaboration,
older Supreme Court cases with less relevance to contractual waiver
jurisprudence. 12 1 However, even if another circuit were to reject Erie's
117. As this Article goes to press, in 2006, the U.S. Senate is considering the Ensign Bill,
which would preempt municipalities from entering into these negotiations by making cable
franchising a matter of federal law. In the event that the Ensign Bill becomes law, the
federal government would be responsible for negotiating quid pro quos with cable
providers. By placing cable franchising under federal control, the relationship between cable
companies and the government would be more like the relationship between broadcasters
and the government, which has always been governed exclusively by federal law. See
Broadband Investment and Consumer Choice Act, S. 1504, 109th Cong. (2005).
118. See, e.g., Erie, 853 F.2d at 1101.
119. Id. at 1096.
120. See Erie 853 F.2d at 1096 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972)).
121. Chicago Cable Comm. v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir.
1989).
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concept of volition and understanding, the court would have to undertake
the same type of thorough analysis of Fuentes and Overmyer that the Third
Circuit undertook. 122 In analyzing these two cases, a court would have to
discuss why the Supreme Court decided for waiver in Overmyer but against
waiver in Fuentes. Since Fuentes expressly embraces lack of "awareness of
the significance" of the waiver as its standard for invalidating contractual
waiver, merely demonstrating that the parties had unequal bargaining
power would therefore not be consistent with the Supreme Court's
treatment of the issue.
123
Some might complain that a content-based right of access places too
great a burden on broadcasters' speech rights; however, the reality is that
there is no burden under the First Amendment, only a conditional
government benefit at stake. If a particular speaker does not want to accept
the speech limitations required by government as a quid pro quo for
receiving this benefit, that speaker can still exercise its free speech rights.
Put simply, there is no burden whatsoever. The speaker has merely chosen
not to accept a government benefit on which the government has a right to
place restrictions. The plausibility of this argument is suggested in Red
Lion itself, not in the scarcity rationale, but in the opinion's less
controversial broadcaster-as-public-fiduciary analysis.124 Since
broadcasters are receiving an exclusive benefit that is owned by the public,
government is free to impose conditions and responsibilities upon them.
Broadcasters are like private companies hired to manage a public housing
project, or concessionaires in a public park-the government does not deny
rights by imposinA conditions on those seeking to profit from government-
owned resources.
B. The Scrutiny Alternative: Quid Pro Quo under the O'Brien Test
In cases involving structural cable regulation, including cable access
cases, courts have addressed quid pro quo arguments through an
application of the O'Brien test of intermediate scrutiny. Under the O'Brien
test, a "content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First
Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further those interests."1 26 In those cases, the quid
122. Erie, 853 F.2d at 1095-97.
123. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95.
124. Red Lion Brdcst. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
125. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-98 (1991) (holding that the government
could impose conditions on recipients of a government benefit without violating the
recipients' First Amendment rights).
126. Turner I, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). See
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pro quo argument is used more narrowly in order to address the issue of
burden under the O'Brien test's fourth prong.127
Although quid pro quo is no longer applied expressly in the context of
contractual bargaining, courts employ a quid pro quo analysis within the
framework of O'Brien's scrutiny of substantial governmental interest and,
more importantly, narrow tailoring. 128 The end result is that subsequent
courts have justified government regulations because, first, the government
has a substantial interest in regulating rights of a private party that would
not have existed but for the government's decision to grant a special benefit
not available to everyone, and second, the burden on cable's speech rights
is low since it benefits from a government monopoly.1
29
In Chicago Cable, the Seventh Circuit adopted the intermediate
scrutiny approach to quid pro quo by applying the O'Brien test to the city's
cable access regulations. The court characterizes its decision to use
O'Brien as a "novel question," since the Supreme Court, at least as of
1989, had not yet determined "the applicable standard for review" for a
First Amendment challenge to municipal cable regulations. 13 1 The Court's
choice in applying the O'Brien test is significant since it presages the
approach to constitutional scrutiny that the Supreme Court later applies to
structural cable regulation, impacting cable speech rights in Turner H.132
also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
127. The fourth prong of the O'Brien test requires that the "incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Turner II court found that the must-carry provisions
met the fourth prong of the O'Brien test "[b]ecause the burden imposed by must-carry is
congruent to the benefits it affords... [and]... must-carry is narrowly tailored to preserve a
multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of American households without cable."
520 U.S. at 215-16. In applying the fourth prong, the Turner II court considered earlier
precedent. Id. at 216 ('" [T]he essence of narrow tailoring' is 'focus[ing] on the source of the
evils the [Government] seeks to eliminate [without] significantly restricting a substantial
quantity of speech that does not create the same evils."') (citing Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 n.7 (1989)).
128. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 215-16 ("Because the burden imposed by must-carry is
congruent to the benefits it affords, we conclude must-carry is narrowly tailored to preserve
a multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of American households without
cable."). See also Chicago Cable Comm. v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1549
(1989).
129. See generally Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 180 (upholding a city's "must-carry"
provisions explaining that the ordinances did not violate the First Amendment).
130. Chicago Cable, 879 F.2d at 1549.
131. Id. at 1548.
132. Compare id. at 1548-49, with Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), and Turner 11, 520
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Chicago Cable applied the O'Brien test to a city regulation requiring
locally originated programming and focused on the economic scarcity of
cable as a medium under the fourth prong of the O'Brien test, which, as
interpreted in Fox and Clark,133 requires that the "means must be narrowly
tailored but not necessarily the least restrictive alternative."' 134 While the
case cites Red Lion as an example of justified government regulation of
television and distinguishes Red Lion from Tornillo, the opinion makes an
economic scarcity argument quite different from the allocational scarcity
justification offered for access under the Fairness Doctrine. 13 5 It is an
argument about market power that applies to all electronic media in which
access is controlled: "Cable programming, like other forms of the
electronic media, is an economically scarce medium. Unlike the traditional
forms of print media, a cable programmer enjoys a virtual monopoly over
its area, without the threat of an alternative provider."'
136
What is most significant about Chicago Cable is its willingness
expressly to engage a quid pro quo argument to justify content-neutral
regulation as narrowly tailored under the O'Brien test.1 37 As the court
explains it, the government "is duty-bound to recognize the effects of
'medium scarcity' by ensuring that the few programmers who are granted a
franchise make optimum use of it." 138 Therefore, because the government
has granted the cable system economic rights that are not available to all,
the government can require the cable entity to give up some of its speech
rights on behalf of cable customers. 139Although the Chicago Cable opinion
focuses on a single franchise with monopoly power over access, Turner II
expands the economic scarcity argument to encompass restricted
competition. '
40
In Turner II, the Supreme Court held, five to four, that federal
legislation requiring cable systems to retransmit local broadcast signals did
U.S. at 189.
133. Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Clark v. Cmty.
for CreaLive Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
134. Chicago Cable, 879 F.2d at 1550.
135. Compare id., 879 F.2d at 1550, with Red Lion Brdcst. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-
01(1969).
136. Chicago Cable, 879 F.2d at 1550.
137. See id.
138. Id. (citation omitted). See also Cmty. Comm. Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d
1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981); Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976,
986-87 (D.R.I. 1983).
139. See Chicago Cable, 879 F.2d at 1550 (holding that the city's ordinance requiring
time for local programming was valid because of the "virtual monopoly" over television
media); Turner II, 520 U.S. at 215-16 (holding that the "must-carry" provisions were valid
because the burden imposed was proportionate to the benefit afforded).
140. Compare Chicago Cable, 879 F.2d at 1550, with Turner l, 520 U.S. at 197.
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not violate the First Amendment rights of cable interests.1 41 In validating
these so-called "must-carry" rules, five justices determined that regulations
designed to foster diversity, localism, and certain types of programming
were content-neutral regulations subject to a highly deferential application
of intermediate scrutiny under the O'Brien test. 142 While the Turner 1I case
settled the narrow question of whether the government could mandate
broadcaster access to cable systems, the implications of both Justice
Kennedy's principal opinion and Justice Breyer's concurrence may be far
reaching with respect to a different type of access: access by the public to
media owned or dominated by an increasingly small number of corporate
conglomerates.
Justice Breyer determined that speech burden can be mitigated under
the fourth prong of the O'Brien test of intermediate scrutiny when media
entities have benefited from a grant of monopoly power from
government. 143 In a concurrence that provided the pivotal fifth majority
vote in the case, Justice Breyer recognizes that governmental regulations
suppressing cable speech rights are justified since cable systems "face[]
little competition" and, therefore, act as a "bottleneck that controls the
range of viewer choice . .,,44 The same logic would apply to broadcast
licensees since they also face little economic competition and control what
viewers can see in a medium with great market power. If a local cable
system can be required to give the public access to its conduit, so too
should broadcasters be required to provide the general public with a right
of access to the conglomerate's media holdings in exchange for the
government permitting the conglomerate to increase its financial interest in
media properties that receive a government benefit, such as a license or
infrastructure rights of way.
Turner II is also instructive since the Supreme Court determined that
the 1992 Cable Act's "must-carry" rules were narrowly tailored because
they scaled the burden in accordance with an Multiple Service Operator's
("MSO's") channel capacity.1 45 In Sections 614 and 615 of the
Communications Act of 1934, Congress very specifically set forth an
escalating must-carry obligation: systems with fewer than 12 channels have
a low burden, systems with 12-36 channels have an intermediate burden,
and systems with more than 36 channels have the greatest burden. 146 The
Act also exempts the smallest systems-those with fewer than 300
141. 520 U.S. 180.
142. Id. See also O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
143. Turner I 520 U.S. at 227-28 (Breyer, J., concurring).
144. Id.
145. Id. at215-16.
146. See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2000).
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subscribers-from the rules entirely.147 This scaling scheme, absent in
previous codifications of the must-carry rules, was key to the Turner II
Court's determination that the 1992 rules were narrowly tailored.1 48
Indeed, in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
the D.C. Circuit struck down must-carry rules precisely because they
applied to all MSOs equally, and thus were too burdensome on the smallest
cable systems.1
49
Like the "must-carry" rules upheld in Turner II,15° any speech burden
on broadcasters is mitigated by the fact that the amount of access to be
provided can be linked proportionately to market power granted, just as the
scaled "must-carry" regime under the 1992 Cable Act mitigated the burden
on cable speech interests.1 51 Moreover, any burden is further reduced by
current technological innovations, such as digital compression and signal
multiplexing, because public access could be limited to one programming
stream, permitting broadcasters to control content on the remaining streams
of their signal bandwidth.1
52
In a quid pro quo access system, scaling a court-determined burden is
relatively easy to accomplish. Since the amount of time or space devoted to
public access is scaled to the amount of additional market power from
which the conglomerate is seeking to benefit, any burden would be
mitigated for media companies with smaller market reach. In that respect,
public access would operate in a manner similar to the 1992 Cable Act's
narrowly tailored "must-carry" rules. In any event, this narrow tailoring
analysis would only be necessary if the courts determine that a quid pro
quo access system is a content-neutral structural regulation that burdens the
conglomerate's speech rights, a proposition that would not be easy to make
because the quid pro quo is voluntarily entered into. Thus, even if courts
were to determine that a market power quid pro quo would impose a real
147. Id.
148. Turner l, 520 U.S. at 215-16 (citations omitted):
Because the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the benefits it affords,
we conclude must-carry is narrowly tailored to preserve a multiplicity of
broadcast stations for the 40 percent of American households without cable. ....
Congress took steps to confine the breadth and burden of the regulatory scheme.
For example... Congress exempted systems of 12 or fewer channels, and limited
the must-carry obligation of larger systems to one-third of capacity, allowed cable
operators discretion in choosing which competing and qualified signals would be
carried, and permitted operators to carry public stations on unused public,
educational, and governmental channels in some circumstances.
149. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d 1434.
150. Turner H, 520 U.S. at 185.
151. 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2000); see Turner II, 520 U.S. at 215-16 (concluding that the
must-carry provisions were narrowly tailored). See also infra note 173 and accompanying
discussion.
152. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying discussion.
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speech burden on media conglomerates that choose to enter into the
bargain, the government could make a strong argument that any burden
would be narrowly tailored under the O'Brien test.
Structural regulation also has the additional benefit of being content-
neutral. In its analysis of burden, Chicago Cable focuses on the fact that the
regulation is minimally burdensome because it does not recuire the cable
system to air any specific program or editorial viewpoint. Turner 11, as
explained above, similarly extends the content-neutrality analysis to types
of programming, including local and diverse. 154 The idea here is that while
the government cannot require specific content to be aired, it can require
that cable companies air types of programs that further governmental
interests without sacrificing content-neutrality. 155 This would surely
encompass regulations requiring electronic media-including
broadcasting-to give access to local or diverse content.
Finally, with respect to both quid pro quo approaches, the diversity
justifications for regulation of the cable medium would apply even more
directly to broadcasting, since the reasons for the legislation relate to the
protection of government-owned airwaves. Putting aside the now
controversial scarcity justifications of the Red Lion case, 156 the diversity
and localism considerations that justified structural regulation of cable in
Turner 11157 make even more sense in the context of broadcasting.
Broadcast frequencies, unlike cable transmissions, are a medium that by
their very nature belong to the public. Broadcasters, of course, operate on
these frequencies only to the extent that Congress permits them, through
licensing and regulatory oversight. 158 As such, requiring broadcasters to
give up rights of access--even content-based ones-as a quid pro quo for
receipt or continuance of an operating license is quite reasonable. The
Chicago Cable and the Turner 11 decisions thus effectively open the door to
a regulatory approach that, with government action, would overcome
constitutional concerns that heretofore prevented or hindered Congress
153. Chicago Cable Comm. v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1551 (1989).
154. See Turner I, 520 U.S. at 186.
155. Id. at213.
156. Red Lion Brdcst. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
157. Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 226-27 (In justifying the First Amendment "price" suffered
by cable operators and some viewers in implementing the must-carry rules, the court refers
to the regulatory scheme's benefits, such as "prevent[ing] too precipitous a decline in the
quality and quantity of programming choice for an ever-shrinking non-cable-subscribing
segment of the public," and explains, "[t]his purpose reflects what 'has long been a basic
tenet of national communications policy,' namely, that 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."')
(citations omitted).
158. See FCC, How to Apply for a Broadcast Station, http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/how
toapply.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
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from enacting, and the FCC from enforcing, a general right of access to
media.
IV. MULTIPLEXING AS ACCESS OPPORTUNITY
A. Multiplexing as an Additional Government Benefit
In the 1990s, Congress enacted a transition to digital broadcasting in
what was originally described as an effort to bring high-definition
television ("HDTV") to American households. 159 To facilitate this
transition, Congress gave each incumbent licensee an amount of bandwidth
set aside for digital transmission that was equal to the amount it used for
analog broadcasting. Since digital signals can transmit data much more
efficiently than analog, broadcasters would be able to use their new digital
spectrum to carry an HDTV signal. 16 As it turned out, this increased signal
efficiency gave broadcasters an unanticipated economic benefit. Instead of
using the entire digital signal to air data-intensive HDTV video,
broadcasters can divide and compress their bandwidth into as many as five,
six, and possibly more signal streams airing programming in standard
definition DTV. 16 1 Known generally as "multiplexing," the ability to split
their bandwidth has enabled local stations to air different programs
simultaneously as if they were separate channels on the digital televisions
currently being sold in the U.S.
162
Although licensees today consider it their right to multiplex, and
nearly all of them do, 16 3 this added benefit was conferred upon them by the
159. See Advanced Television Systems, First Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627, at
para. 8 (1990) [hereinafter Advanced Television Systems].
160. HDTV refers to a television signal that is transmitted in a high resolution.
"Resolution is the amount of detail that can be seen in an image.... [and] can be expressed
in terms of the number of horizontal lines of picture elements..." ("pixels") contained in a
television picture. CHARLES D. FERRIS & FRANK W. LLOYD, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION: CABLE, BROADCASTING, SATELLITE, AND THE INTERNET, 23B--6 n.1 (2002).
Since 1940, the U.S. has used the National Television System Committee ("NTSC")
standard of 525 lines per screen with an aspect ratio of 4 to 3. The 4:3 aspect ratio, which
corresponds to the shape of an ordinary analog television screen, is the reason most TV
programs have traditionally been created, or in the case of film, modified, to appear in a
roughly square frame. While not all HDTV signals are digital, current HDTV standards for
DTV can more than double the number of screen lines available in an NTSC signal (1000-
1200 as opposed to 525) with an aspect ratio of 16:9 (1.78:1). The result is a widescreen
television image that approximates the height and width of a theatrical motion picture and
the resolution of 35mm film. Id. at 23B-7.
161. Standard definition DTV offers resolution and audio reproduction that is superior to
the NTSC analog signal. See, e.g., Advanced Television Systems, supra note 159, at paras.
40-42.
162. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(3)(A) (2000).
163. See, e.g., R. Thomas Umstead & Linda Moss, Much Ado about Multicasting:
Broadcasters Getting New Nets Off Ground, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 12, 2005, at 6.
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government. Concerned that the costs of transitioning from one NTSC
signal to one HDTV signal would not lead to a "satisfactory return on
investment," 164 broadcasters lobbied hard for permission to split their
signals, and the FCC was largely sympathetic. FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes
acknowledged the practical benefit of digital multiplexing when he stated
in 1992 that "there are 'political, economic and legal reasons why' the
transition must be from one 6 mhz channel to one 6 mhz channel." 16 That
same year, in a concurrence to an FCC opinion and comment solicitation
on Advanced Television ("ATV"), Commissioner Sherrie Marshall
apparently realized that multiplexing, and not HDTV, would be the real
benefit of digital broadcasting: "I am becoming increasingly convinced,
however, that the real key to broadcasters' continued competitiveness lies
not so much in ATV as a crisp picture, but in its potential for spectrum-
efficient multiplexing. In my view, broadcasters must become multichannel
providers to continue to flourish in the long run."
1 66
The National Association of Broadcasters and other industry
representatives took the issue of "digital spectrum flexibility" before
Congress in late 1993.167 Broadcasters evidently waited until Chairman
Sikes, who insisted that DTV be high-definition, was succeeded by Clinton
Administration appointee Reed Hundt, who favored spectrum flexibility
over mandatory HDTV. 16 8 In Senate hearings, public interest advocates
argued that broadcast multiplexing would give broadcasters a benefit not
originally envisioned. Congress, nonetheless, gave broadcasters everything169 .. .
they wanted. With spectrum flexibility, digital broadcasters can vary the
number of programming streams available at any time, airing one signal in
HDTV or many in standard definition depending on their programming
needs.1 70 Under the 1996 Act, broadcasters can also make multiplexed
program streams available for uses other than advertiser-supported free
broadcasting, including leased access and subscription services. 171
164. MICHEL DUPAGNE & PETER B. SEEL, HIGH-DEFINITION TELEVISION: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 25 (1998).
165. Peter Lambert, FCC and Broadcasters Battle Toward Flexible HDTV Conversion,
BRDCST. & CABLE, Oct. 5, 1992, at 14.
166. Certain ATV Issues Resolved; Further Comment Sought on Other Issues, Action,
Docket No. 87-268, 1992 FCC LEXIS 5434, at *7 (Sept. 17, 1992).
167. JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION
307-08 (1997).
168. Id. at 309.
169. Title VII, The Communications Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 1822 Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong. (1994) (testimony of
Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Executive Director, Media Access Project).
170. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
171. Id.Seealsoid.at§201(b).
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B. Scaled Bandwidth/Time-Based Access Formula
One formula, noted below in Figure One, would be to scale the
amount of access; in this case, time and/or bandwidth as a function of the
percentage of national audience a broadcaster's licenses reach, as measured
by the FCC. Thus, a conglomerate with 50 percent of national reach could
be responsible for setting aside bandwidth that would enable the public
access to one programming stream, one day a week. A greater or lesser
amount of time and/or bandwidth could also be achieved by adjusting the
conversion factor up or down. Setting a value for the conversion factor
would be a matter for Congress or the FCC to determine. Congress could
presumably develop more complicated formulae that could account for
characteristics of the speakers granted access. For example, Congress could
adjust the conversion factor based on the degree of diversity or localism
among the users. Access could be based on the status of a petitioner as
"local," and possibly even the local nature of the speech itself, since Turner
II held that laws that promote locally based programming and quality
programming were not impermissible content regulations.
The formula for scaled zone-based access:
z =_p_(u)
f
z=zone of access based on bandwidth and/or time
p=market reach, as measured by FCC
fAfactor of conversion to be determined by Congress
u=unit of time or space measurement (e.g. minutes or sq. inches)
Figure One.
Formula for Zone-Based Access
In the context of the digital broadcast television, the access
component of time could be supplanted by bandwidth. On digital television
sets, multiplexed broadcast signals appear as subchannels that can easily be
accessed by viewers. 173 Since multiplexing would essentially permit
172. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). "[I]ncreasing the number of outlets for community
self-expression" represents a "long-established regulatory goa[l] in the field of television
broadcasting." Id. at 192, quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667-
68. Congress identified a specific interest in "ensuring [the] continuation" of "the local
origination of [broadcast] programming." Turner II, 520 U.S. at 193, citing Turner I, 512
U.S. at 652.
173. See Searchnetworking.com, Modulation: Multiplexing, http://searchnetworking.tech
target.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci212586,00.html (last visited on Nov. 13, 2006). See also
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licensees to transmit programming seamlessly to a number of subchannels
simultaneously, the bandwidth access formula would account for
proportionate access by requiring a broadcaster to dedicate all or part of a
subchannel, or perhaps even more than one subchannel, to public access,
depending on the amount of additional market power granted to the
broadcaster.174 From a policy standpoint, requiring licensees to "give back"
some of the benefit of increased programming capacity now possible with
digital transmissions makes sense. In this respect, setting aside one or two
programming streams out of a multiplexed broadcast signal for public
access is not that much different than the public access set-asides already in
place for cable 17 and direct broadcast satellite 176 systems under the 1992
Cable Act. Those set-asides, which scale the number of public access
channels proportionally to a system's total channel capacity, were upheld
as constitutional structural regulation by the D.C. Circuit in Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC.177 Broadcast set-asides would also be consistent
with the position of the Gore Commission, which in the late 1990s
recommended that digital broadcasters be required to dedicate some of
their more efficient bandwidth to public interest programming. 178
Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure and
Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 1
(2004); 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(3XA); TV Stereophonic Aural and Multiplex Subcarrier
Operation, 47 C.F.R. § 73.669(b) (2005); Carriage of Transmissions of Digital TV Brdcst.
Stations, Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 15092, at para. 71 (1998).
174. See Varona, supra note 173, at 89.
175. § 532(b)(1) of the 1992 Cable Act scales channel set-asides into four tiers, as
follows:
(A) An operator of any cable system with 36 or more (but not more than 54)
activated channels shall designate 10 percent of such channels... not otherwise
required for use .... (B) An operator of any cable system with 55 or more (but
not more that 100) activated channels shall designate 15 percent of such
channels ... not otherwise required for use .... (C) An operator of any cable
system with more than 100 activated channels shall designate 15 percent of all
such channels. (D) An operator of any cable system with fewer than 36 activated
channels shall not be required to designate channel capacity for commercial use
by persons unaffiliated with the operator, unless the cable system is required to
provide such channel capacity under the terms of a franchise in effect on October
30, 1984.
Id.
176. 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (2000). Although the statute does not expressly scale the
DBS set-aside obligation, Congress intended that the percentage of capacity to be allocated
to noncommercial educational or informational programming should be considered in light
of the total channel capacity of the DBS system in question, with larger capacity systems
required to reserve a higher percentage of capacity than smaller DBS systems. See S. REP.
No. 102-92 at 92 (1991).
177. Time Warner Entm't Co., v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
178. See NTIA, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCAST FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF
ADVISORY COMMI-rEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
BROADCASTERS (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf.
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Moreover, the notion that digital broadcasters can earmark a
multiplexed channel for transmissions not related to their over-the-air
broadcasting service has already been recognized by the FCC in its
regulations governing digital television. Section 73.624(g) of the Code of
Federal Regulations allows licensees effectively to sublease a multiplexed
subchannel to themselves or third parties for private use, provided that the
licensee tenders an annual fee representing five percent of the revenue
received from these ancillary services. 179 Permitting digital broadcasters to
privatize public airwaves in return for a fee seems very different from
requiring broadcasters to dedicate a programming stream to public access
in return for market power, but the logic is the same. In both cases, the
licensee would essentially be "spinning-off' a portion of its bandwidth to
operations not related to its use of the airwaves for broadcast programming.
The only difference is that in a zoned-access regime, the beneficiary would
be the public, and the content transmitted on any dedicated subchannel
would not be subject to the licensee's control or gate keeping.
Additionally, such a system would be relatively easy to measure and
monitor since it essentially creates a relationship between the market power
given and the time or bandwidth yielded. Since the government gives
broadcasters measurable market power in granting a broadcast license, such
a scaled right of access would be constitutional as a structural regulation, so
long as access were determined through content-neutral means such as a
lottery, first come, first served basis, or random selection rather than
through a content-driven selection process.i18
V. EXTENDING THE QUID PRO Quo TO ALL CONGLOMERATE-
OWNED MEDIA
Given that a broadcast license grants a great government benefit of
market power to a broadcaster, the question remains, what should the
See also JAMES M. BURGER & TODD GRAY, THE GORE COMMISSION REPORT ON PUBLIC
INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL BROADCASTERS (1999), available at
http://www.digitaltelevision.com/law/law199.shtml; The Media Institute, The Gore
Commission, http://www.mediainstitute.org/gore/gcl.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
179. 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(g) (2005) ("Commercial and noncommercial DTV licensees
must annually remit a fee of five percent of the gross revenues derived from all ancillary or
supplementary services, as defined by paragraph (b) of this section .... ").
180. "First Come, First Served" is the process of filling applications on a first come, first
served basis. "Random Selection" is the process of placing applications meeting
specifications in a random order, usually by a computer program, and then filling the
applications in that random order. Judge Spatt, Court Declines to Enjoin Cable TV
Operator's Changes to Public Access Channel Time Slots, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 2005, at 24.
Accord Morrone v. CSC Holdings Corp., 363 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). "Lottery" is
the process of distributing tickets to all applicants and then granting applications to those
who hold the winning number(s), which are drawn at random. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
966 (8th ed. 2004).
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government require in exchange for this benefit of market power? The
answer is simple-diversity and localism. 18 1 The government should
require a broadcaster to provide access to the general public in order to
ensure local and diverse content. Based on the expansive contractual quid
pro quo theory outlined above, a content-based approach such as the
Fairness Doctrine-independent of scarcity justifications-would be
constitutionally permissible. If the government were to bargain with
broadcasters over market power, it might be possible to extend broadcast
access regulations to non broadcast media owned by broadcasters.
A. Waiving First Amendment Rights or Exchanging Speech Burden
for Access
The fundamental question here is not whether the First Amendment
rights of nonscarce print publishers would be infringed upon, but rather
whether the quid pro quo can be sufficiently broad to include a waiver of
the publisher's free speech rights for nonbroadcast media. Again, under the
Supreme Court's reasoning in the contractual quid pro quo cases, a party to
contract can waive constitutional rights as a condition for receiving the
benefit offered in the bargain. 82 Thus, just as the government can impose
conditions on the grant of a broadcast license, it follows that the
government can broaden the condition to address market power even to
print. Tornillo would not be implicated by such a broadly constructed183
condition agreed to by a conglomerate as part of a voluntary contract. As
was the case with cable owners, the owners of print publications are not
required by the government to give up a portion of their publication, here
measured as space and location, as opposed to time; the conglomerates
remain free to exercise their full First Amendment rights by choosing not to
accept the additional broadcast market power being offered to them.
181. See, e.g., FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Brdcst. ("Nat'l Citizens"), 436 U.S. 773,
777 (1978) ("the FCC made a rational judgment in concluding that the need for
diversification was especially great in cases of local monopoly." The Supreme Court held
that the challenged regulations, which were designed to promote diversification of the mass
media as a whole, were properly based on the "public interest" standard). See also id. at 780
("In setting its licensing policies, the Commission has long acted on the theory that
diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by promoting diversity of
program and service viewpoints, as well as by preventing undue concentration of economic
power.") (citations omitted).
182. See, e.g., Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1998).
183. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In 1974, the Court held
a Florida statute requiring newspapers to provide right of reply for political candidates
unconstitutional because newspapers are not a scarce resource. However, due to
consolidation of media outlets in recent years and the scarcity of major newspapers even in
big cities, it is conceivable that the court would include a conglomerate's newspaper entities,
in addition to its broadcast and cable outlets, as part of an entire corporate media package
from which the conglomerate is reaping a benefit. See id.
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While the contractual waiver approach could result in a host of
content regulations in which a conglomerate's ownership of broadcast
properties could be leveraged against the acceptance of content regulations
affecting their non broadcast properties, such a revolutionary approach
would be unprecedented and, in light of current law, unnecessary. Under
the narrow O'Brien quid pro quo approach, the market-power-for-zoned-
access quid pro quo also could effectively provide the public with structural
access to newspapers and other publications owned by broadcast
conglomerates. 184 In addition to being more politically palatable, such a
regulation, in which the government would require a content-neutral unit-
based approach to media access, makes sense for four reasons.
First, requiring media conglomerates to accept a structural regulation
in return for market power avoids the enforcement problems that plagued
the Fairness Doctrine, including concerns over the definition of
controversial issues and the chilling effect on broadcaster speech.
185
Second, a structural regulation that grants local and diverse access without
regard to content helps foster diversity without making content judgments
that might overlook similar but not identical views, or views clearly out of
the mainstream. Third, it also takes the broadcaster out of the gate keeping
process, removing any question of editorial favoritism or bias based on
political or social agenda.
Fourth, as important as the aforemhentioned benefits are, what makes
structural regulation as a quid pro quo for media market power especially
attractive is its potential application to non broadcast media such as cable-
where Turner H and the O'Brien test already apply-and in some cases,
even to print media, Tornillo notwithstanding. Unlike scarcity, which
reaches only to a company's broadcast frequencies, but not to other media
properties owned by that same company, a structural market-power quid
pro quo model offers at least the potential to be applied across different
184. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (holding that where a regulation
furthers a substantial government interest, provided that it is narrowly tailored, the limitation
on speech is constitutional).
185. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392-93 (1969) (In upholding the
Fairness Doctrine, the Red Lion Court stated, "station owners and a few networks would
have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate
only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only
those with whom they agreed."). Additionally, the Court agreed with station owners'
arguments:
[I]f political editorials or personal attacks will trigger an obligation in broadcasters
to afford the opportunity for expression to speakers who need not pay for time and
whose views are unpalatable to the licensees, then broadcasters will be irresistibly
forced to self-censorship and their coverage of controversial public issues will be
eliminated or at least rendered wholly ineffective.
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media, when different media properties are owned by the same entity.
This broader scope of regulation would be constitutional under
O'Brien, as applied in Turner II, because the broadcasters can effectively
be required to give up their First Amendment rights in return for a
government benefit of being a broadcaster.1 86 As was the case with the
contractual approach, the only question would be whether the government
could extend the burden it is already permitted to exact against a
broadcaster to First Amendment rights that would otherwise be beyond the
government's ability to regulate, absent a compelling interest. In that sense,
it is not much different from content-neutral, market-based logic that led
the Supreme Court to validate broadcast cross-ownership regulations in
1978.1 7 Cross-ownership rules, though not currently in favor at the FCC,
require companies who own different media properties to divest
nonbroadcast properties in local markets with excessive ownership
concentration. 1
This proposed quid pro quo approach, while consistent with Justice
Marshall's thinking in National Citizens, would be far less burdensome (if
at all) on broadcasters than cross-ownership regulations.1 9 Here, if
broadcasters want access to licenses with greater market reach, they must
give back some of that power by providing time-based diverse and local
access, not only on their broadcast stations, but also on their cable
channels. As is often the case in contract law, the broadcaster does not have
to accept the government's offer.' 90 These broadcasters may be permitted
to broadcast, but they would not be permitted to amass the type of media
ownership that many media conglomerates seek today. Moreover, they may
not be permitted to own other non broadcast properties in markets where
cross-ownership rules are needed to guard against local concentration.
B. Content-Neutral Right ofAccess and Editorial Discretion
Constructing the public's right not as a right of reply but rather as a
content-neutral right of access, makes it possible to overcome Tornillo's
concern that the government must not intrude into the discretion of the
editorial boardroom. The government is not forcing the print publication to
print anything. The corporate ownership, choosing to avail itself of a
government incentive, would be the one to make the business decision to
186. Id. at 400 (recognizing the advantages of viewer loyalty and network affiliation as
the "fruit of a preferred position conferred [to the broadcasters] by the Government.").
187. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 773, 801-02 (1978).
188. Id. at 779, 783-84.
189. See id.
190. See generally Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract, U.C.C. § 2-206
(2003).
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provide an access comer or access page in the publication. Government
censors or gatekeepers would not be asserting their editorial judgment in
determining the content of the speech or who would get access. A
governmental system can simply be designed to permit structural access
based on the type of content-local and diverse-just as a majority of the
Supreme Court did in Turner II when it determined that the 1992 Cable
Act's "must-carry" rules were not a content regulation, even though they
promoted diverse and local programming over other types of
programming. 
191
By making the access decisions nondiscretionary for editors, the quid
pro quo system would be the type of non editorial structural access that the
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional in Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations.192 In Pittsburgh Press, the Court held
that a government regulation requiring gender equal access to classified job
listings did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of newspapers.193
In that case, the Court reasoned that the compelled access did not infringe
on speech rights because it lay outside the editorial sphere. 194 Critical to the
Court's finding was that advertising staff were charged with making the
access decisions for classified listings, not editors. Decisions on how to
apportion access to public speech zones would be even further outside the
editorial sphere, as they would be business decisions made in the board
room of the publication's corporate parent, and not by the staff of the
newspaper. All the staff of the newspaper would need to do would be to
implement a corporate policy that would provide access to local and
diverse sources without regard to specific content. 195 Making access a
business decision implemented by noneditorial staff also addresses the
191. Turner 11, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
192. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 386 ("Under some circumstances, at least, a newspaper's editorial judgments
in connection with an advertisement take on the character of the advertisement and, in those
cases, the scope of the newspaper's First Amendment protection may be affected by the
content of the advertisement."). See also id. at 391:
we reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the
free expression of views on these and other issues, however controversial. We
hold only that the Commission's modified order, narrowly drawn to prohibit
placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for nonexempt job
opportunities, does not infringe the First Amendment rights of Pittsburgh Press.
195. Id. at 386:
The Commission made a finding of fact that Pittsburgh Press defers in every case
to the advertiser's wishes regarding the column in which a want ad should be
placed. It is nonetheless true, however, that the newspaper does make a judgment
whether or not to allow the advertiser to select the column. We must therefore
consider whether this degree of judgmental discretion by the newspaper with
respect to a purely commercial advertisement is distinguishable, for the purposes
of First Amendment analysis, from the content of the advertisement itself.
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Tornillo Court's concern that permitting government to mandate access
would have a chilling effect on journalists, since they would avoid
controversial topics or criticism. 196 This fear of a chilling effect is also a
principal objection lodged against the Fairness Doctrine, and, to some
extent, was borne out during the twenty-five years that the doctrine was
enforced by the FCC. 197 The beauty of a structural access zone approach is
that it has virtually no editorial impact on journalists. To the extent, for
example, that a corporate parent decides that it will trade market power for
space or time, such a decision is essentially no different from the Tribune
Company determining how many pages of a publication would be devoted
to advertising in the Los Angeles Times or General Electric deciding how
many commercials it will sell during prime time on its NBC television
network. In each case, these decisions are made by business executives
who are removed from the creative or journalistic decisionmaking. Unlike
the Florida reply statute found unconstitutional in Tornillo, and unlike the
no longer enforced Fairness Doctrine, access is not triggered by specific
content or lack of it.198 Access is merely granted in proportion to the
market power granted by government.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that companies owning broadcast
licenses with little market power would not be covered by the proposed
196. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) ("Faced with the
penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably
within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe
course is to avoid controversy.").
197. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations, 102 F.C.C.2d 142 (1986) [hereinafter Fairness
Doctrine Obligations]:
On basis of a comprehensive record, Commission determined the fairness doctrine
in operation thwarts [the] laudatory purpose it is designed to promote. Instead of
furthering discussion of public issues, Commission found the doctrine inhibits
[broadcasters] from airing controversial issue programming. In addition,
Commission expressed concern that administration of fairness doctrine has
unintentionally resulted in stifling viewpoints which may be unorthodox,
unpopular or unestablished.
198. Id. at para. 3, stating:
The fairness doctrine, as developed by the Commission, imposes upon
broadcasters a two-pronged obligation. Broadcast licensees are required to provide
coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest in the community
served by the licensees and to provide a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues.
(citations omitted); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258
(The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials-whether fair or unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed).
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zone access system. Independent, "mom and pop" operations would have
no reason to enter into the quid pro quo bargained-for exchange, unless, of
course, they were interested in strengthening their market power through
horizontal acquisitions in broadcast television and radio. The same is true
for independent newspapers and magazines. Without concentrated
broadcast ownership, the government benefit essential to a quid pro quo
analysis is absent. In such a case, print publications, even ones owned by
powerful corporations, would not be subject to any type of government-
sponsored public access system, in accordance with the holding in Tornillo.
VI. CONCLUSION
If Congress, the FCC, and the courts accept the idea that broadcasters
can be required to give up some of their speech rights in return for market
power based on a government grant of access, the contentious discussions
about the nexus of ownership and programming content, market-based
content preferences, and multiplicity of sources become moot. 199 Debates
over compulsory speech and chilling effect would no longer exist, as timed
access would not be tied to any particular speech content and would not
require broadcasters to air particular viewpoints. If content regulation under
Red Lion and ownership caps no longer prove viable, this proposal allows
Congress and the courts to promote diversity and localism as structural
broadcast regulation, with obligations predicated on the public interest
mandate of the Communications Act and consistent with the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in Turner I.
Moreover, even if such an access system were ultimately determined
to be a content regulation, Congress and the FCC may nonetheless be able
to avoid constitutional challenges by extending to broadcasting the same
quid pro quo theory used by courts in cable access cases. It may also be
worth considering whether the government has the right to condition its
access to frequencies on broadcasters' agreement to waive certain rights
contractually-including speech rights-as a quid pro quo for receipt of a
government benefit, such as a broadcast license and relaxed ownership
caps-to which they otherwise would have no right.20 Such an approachwould not only provide constitutional justification for intrusive content
199. See Chicago Cable Comm. v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1550 (1989)
(holding that the city's ordinance requiring time for local programming was valid because of
the "virtual monopoly" over television media); Turner 11, 520 U.S. 180, 215-16 (1997)
(holding that the "must-carry" provisions were valid because the burden imposed was
proportionate to the benefit afforded).
200. See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1097 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding the cable company's waiver of its free speech rights was valid because the party
was advised by counsel and the parent cable company had engaged in numerous other
transactions).
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regulations, but may also provide a constitutional means for extending
access rights to print properties owned by media conglomerates,
notwithstanding Tornillo.
In the end, media ownership is not a right; it is a government-i.e.,
public benefit. Thus, media companies can be induced to give up rights or
accept burdens in order to access this benefit. And while it may place some
burden on speech, the burden would be insignificantly low because media
abundance means that licensees have more non broadcast speech
alternatives. Such a plan meets the FCC's public interest mandate by
providing a benefit both to society and to the broadcasters20 1 while
fulfilling a common goal: increasing localism and diversity. Increasing
access to the public is a small price for media conglomerates to pay in
exchange for increased power in the market. Indeed, whether the scaled
quid pro quo metric is justified as a contractual waiver of rights or as
content-neutral structural regulation, it is a system that offers something for
everybody.
Media conglomerates will be able to increase their broadcast holdings
above the present 39 percent cap. Those without the means to afford an
auctioned or transferred license, and those who have no interest in
assuming responsibility for owning or managing a licensee would then
have the opportunity to access stations without regard to content. Licensees
and broadcast news staffs would not suffer the chilling effect of an
ambiguously drafted content regulation such as the Fairness Doctrine, since
access would not be discretionary to the licensee. And because of increased
access, programming would truly be more diverse, just as blogging has
transformed the Internet into a more diverse source of information and
creativity. As with the Internet, market forces may still be in play with
respect to who tunes in, but, at a minimum, the system would also remedy
the problem of corporate gate keeping and homogeneity. Finally, the
system would properly address the issue of localism, a programming
concept that has proven elusive to Congress and the FCC. Local activists,
artists, schools, and community groups can use these set-aside
programming streams to air locally produced or appreciated content in a
manner that seems to be with what Congress originally had in mind when it
passed the Communications Act.
201. See FCC, Localism Task Force Mission Statement, http://www.fcc.gov/localism/
(last visited on Nov. 13, 2006).
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